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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been a long-standing, fundamental maxim of common law that no
one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, take advantage of his own
wrong or to acquire property by his own crime.1 Like other states,
Wisconsin has used this "slayer rule" to disqualify an individual's
inheritance rights when he kills the decedent. 2 States have used the slayer
rule and subsequently enacted slayer statutes to deter crime and prevent
unjust enrichment.3
Nearly every state legislature has codified the common law principle into
a slayer statute and has agreed that a prospective beneficiary who murders
the benefactor may not collect his inheritance.4 State courts, however, have
inconsistently applied their slayer statutes to crimes other than murder.'
Most recently, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not apply its slayer
statute to the offense of assisted suicide in the case of In re Estate of

1. See In re Wilkins' Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 654-55 (Wis. 1927), overruled in part
by In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958) (tracing the origin of the maxim
that one should not profit from his wrongdoing to the Code of Napoleon, the common
law of England, and the foundation of every religious faith).
2. See, e.g., id. at 655 (terminating the murderer's inheritance interest to prevent
him from profiting from his crime).
3. See Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence,
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 620-22 (2009) (noting that slayer statutes typically create a
mandatory prohibition on inheritance even if contrary to the testators' wishes).
4. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 854.14 (2008) (codifying the common law principle that
no beneficiary should benefit from killing a benefactor); see also Alissa Macomber,
Note, To Pay or Not to Pay: The Nevada Slayer Statute and the InsuranceCompanies'
Dilemma, 9 NEV. L.J. 475, 478 (2009) (stating that forty-five states and the District of
Columbia codified the slayer rule).
5. Compare In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Wis. 1981) (declining to
extend the slayer rule to include involuntary manslaughter), with Quick ex rel. Estate of
Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 213 S.E.2d 563, 571 (N.C. 1975) (extending the
slayer rule to involuntary manslaughter because the crime involves acts that are
inconsistent with a proper regard for human life).

2009]

0

TO A, FOR HELPING KILL 0

Schunk.
This Comment argues that Wisconsin should not allow an individual
who commits assisted suicide to inherit from a benefactor whose death
resulted from the assistance. Part II examines the historical development
of Wisconsin's slayer statute and the State's ban on assisted suicide.8
Additionally, Part II of this Comment explores canons of statutory
interpretation, explains the principles of causation in Wisconsin's criminal
code, and discusses the facts and decision in the Schunk case. 9 Part III
argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals erred in Schunk because its
decision frustrated the purpose of the slayer rule by allowing individuals
who commit assisted suicide to inherit. 10 Part IV offers policy arguments
in support of disqualifying individuals who help others commit suicide
from inheriting property of the decedent." Finally, Part V of this Comment
concludes that by barring inheritance to individuals who have committed
assisted suicide, Wisconsin courts would be consistently applying the
State's slayer statute while simultaneously
respecting the State's criminal
12
prohibition of assisted suicide.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Wisconsin's Slayer Statute
1. Common Law Origins
In 1927, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the case of In re Wilkins'
Estate considered the issue of whether a potential beneficiary who
murdered a testator could inherit under the will. 13 By applying the widely6. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157,

13, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760

N.W.2d 446, 448-49, cert. denied sub nom. Lemmer v. Schunk, 2009 WI 23, 764

N.W.2d 532 (holding that the slayer statue does not apply to assisted suicide because it
is not a "killing").
7. See In re Wilkins'Estate, 211 N.W. at 656 (arguing that allowing a criminal to
profit from his crime subverts the purpose of law).
8. See infra Part II.A.1-2, II.B (outlining how the Wisconsin Legislature has
expanded the statute to conform to its common law antecedent).

9. See infra Part II.A.3, II.C, II.D (explaining how the Wisconsin Court of

Appeals concluded that the slayer statute does not reach assisted suicide).
10. See infra Part III (arguing that the court misinterpreted the definition of "to
kill," and thus misunderstood the word "killing" in the slayer statute).
11. See infra Part IV (illustrating how the Schunk decision rewards individuals who
commit assisted suicide while it penalizes those who refuse to be involved).
12. See infra Part V (concluding that assisted suicide is an "unlawful and
intentional killing").
13. See In re Wilkins' Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 653 (Wis. 1927), overruled in part by
In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958) (noting that the case was one of first
impression in the State).
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recognized, equitable doctrine that no one should profit from his own
the court prohibited the beneficiary
wrongdoing ("common law principle"),
14
from collecting his inheritance.
Since the decision in Wilkins' Estate, Wisconsin courts have applied this
common law principle in various other property contexts, including joint
tenancy, insurance claims, and marital property rights. 15 Although
Wisconsin courts have expanded the slayer rule in some decisions, they
have also limited its application by excluding unintentional crimes such as
involuntary manslaughter.' 6 Until Schunk, the Wisconsin courts have not
considered whether committing assisted suicide, an intentional crime,
disqualifies a beneficiary from profiting from the benefactor's will.' 7
2. The Statutory Codification of the Common Law
Although the Wisconsin courts have consistently applied the common
law principle since deciding Wilkins' Estate in 1927, it was not until 1981
that the Legislature codified the principle by adding several amendments to
various Wisconsin statutes. 18 Through the provisions, the Legislature
limited disqualification to intentional killings, thereby confirming the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding that involuntary manslaughter would
not bar a beneficiary from obtaining his inheritance. ' 9
The final wave of changes to the codification of the slayer rule occurred
in 1997 when the Wisconsin Legislature chose to repeal and consolidate the
1981 slayer provisions into a new section entitled "Beneficiary Who Kills
Decedent., 20 While the stated intent of the Legislature was to eradicate

14. See id. at 655-56 (recognizing that English and American common law have
traditionally denied wrongdoers the fruits of their crimes).
15. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hack], 604 N.W.2d 579, 583-84 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(granting the wife's estate a half interest in the husband's pension because the wife s
interest in the pension would have accrued had he not killed her).
16. See, e.g., In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Wis. 1981) (discerning

that the Legislature intended to exclude involuntary crimes from the slayer statute when
it modified the word "killing" with the adjective "intentional").

17. See Marie Rohde, Court Rules on Suicide Heirs: State Allows Inheritancefor
People Who Assist Others in Killing Themselves, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 26,

2008, at B1 (reporting that the court recommended that the decision be published,
indicating that the judges believe it should be precedent-setting).
18. See In re Wilkins' Estate, 211 N.W. at 656 (holding that Wisconsin's adoption
of the slayer rule was consistent with other jurisdictions' affirmation of the rule); see
also Act of Apr. 26, 1982, ch. 228, § 5, 1981 Wis. Sess. Laws 1065 (codified as

amended at Wis. STAT. § 853.11(3m)(2008)) (disqualifying a beneficiary when he
intentionally murders the testator).
19. See In re Estate of Jackson, 569 N.W.2d 467, 470-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)

(holding that a killing that does not require the element of intent cannot be an
intentional killing).

20. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14 (2008) (revoking every statutory right or benefit to
which the killer may have been entitled to after the decedent's death).
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variations and inconsistencies among the 1981 provisions, the drafters
utilized the re-drafting opportunity to make four other significant
changes.21
First, the drafters reduced the plaintiffs burden of proof from a "clear
and convincing evidence" standard to a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard.2 2 Second, the new section expanded the types of killings that
would disqualify beneficiaries by modifying "killing" with "unlawful"
rather than "felonious. 2 3 Third, the drafters further extended the grasp of
the common law principle by mandating that the courts treat wrongful
acquisitions of property not covered under the statute in accordance with
the common law principle that a killer cannot profit from his wrongdoing.2 4
Finally, the revised 1997 statute amended certain special exceptions that
could nullify the application of the slayer statute to an "unlawful and
intentional killing." The drafters revoked a provision that allowed killers to
inherit if exempted by a benefactor in a contract while retaining a provision
that has allowed killers to inherit if exempted by a testator in his will. 25
The drafters also created a new exception that has permitted the courts to
nullify the slayer statute when the courts find that a decedent's wishes
would be attained by not disqualifying a killer.2 6
3. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
A general rule of statutory construction requires that when the language
of a statute is unambiguous, courts shall not look outside the language of
the statute itself, but rather, give the language its common, ordinary, and
accepted meaning. 27 Conversely, when the language of a statute is
21. See Howard S. Erlanger, Wisconsin's New Probate Code: A Handbook for
Practitioners,app. C at 33-34 (1998) (Drafting Committee Notes to 1997 Wisconsin
Act 188) (claiming that Wisconsin's slayer statute now mirrors the Uniform Probate
Code while retaining several unique provisions).
22. See § 854.14(5)(C) (noting that the court need not consider whether there was
an "unlawful and intentional killing" if there was a criminal judgment or an
adjudication of delinquency based on an "unlawful and intentional killing").
23. See § 854.14(2) (requiring that "killings" be "unlawful" in order to exclude
killings that are in self-defense).
24. See § 854.14(4) (stating that the Legislature is unable to foresee all of the
possible wrongful acquisitions of property that should be barred under the statute).
25. See § 854.14(6)(b) (mitigating the harshness of the slayer rule in
acknowledgment of a benefactor's right to control the assignment and allocation of his
property); see also Erlanger, supra note 21, app. C at 33 n.25 (noting that the new
statute allows the decedent to waive the slayer rule only by will because the attestation
requirement for wills helps ensure that the waiver is intentional and genuine).
26. See § 854.14(6)(a) (giving wide discretion to the courts to review the factual
situations created by the "unlawful and intentional killing").
27. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 44-46, 271
Wis. 2d 242, 681 N.W.2d 110, 123-24 (recognizing that the meaning of the words or
phrases in surrounding or closely-related statutes should also be considered to avoid
unreasonable results).
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ambiguous, courts are to examine the legislative history, scope, and stated
purpose of the statute.28 Finally, courts must give specific legal words their
technical meaning in the law.2 9
Through the exercise of statutory interpretation, the courts must strive to
avoid construing a statute in a manner that would defeat its manifest
purpose. 30 For example, in the case of In re Estate of Hack, a husband,
while imprisoned for the murder of his wife, applied for and received

monthly pension benefits. 31 Although the 1981 slayer provisions were
silent on how to treat a murdered spouse's marital interest in a husband's

pension plan, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals used the discretion the
Legislature provided it to apply the common law 32principle to bar the
murderer from collecting his spouse's marital interest.
B.

Wisconsin's Ban on Assisted Suicide

Starting in 1849, Wisconsin criminalized assisted suicide, treating it as

first-degree manslaughter.33
When the Legislature began classifying
degrees of felonies in 1977, it initially made assisted suicide a Class D
felony, but has since reduced the crime to a Class H felony.3 4 To be guilty
of the crime of assisted suicide, a defendant must have intended his actions
to assist the decedent in committing suicide. 35 Through its ban on assisted
28. See In re P.A.K. v. State, 350 N.W.2d 677, 681-83 (Wis. 1984) (explaining that
words or phrases of a statute are ambiguous if they have more than one reasonable
definition).
29. See Wis. STAT. § 990.01 (2008) (providing definitions of a few particular words
or phrases that have specific meanings under Wisconsin law, such as "acquire").
30. See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations
Comm'n, 259 N.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Wis. 1977) (extending unemployment benefits to a
claimant who lost her job for failing a licensing exam that she diligently studied for
because the Legislature only intended to bar employees who were terminated for
"fault," which requires blameworthy, negligent conduct); see also In re Estate of
Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an insane individual
does not "intentionally kill" under Indiana's slayer statute because a contrary ruling
would not further the purpose of the statute).
31. See In re Estate of Hackl, 604 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting
the husband's argument that the wife's marital interest terminated at her death).
32. See id. at 582 (concluding that the Legislature's failure to exempt deferred
pension benefits from the terminable interest rule was not dispositive); see also
Wisconsin ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. for La Crosse County, 340 N.W.2d
460, 464-65 (Wis. 1983) (reiterating that the law provides courts the authority to
resolve statutory ambiguity).
33. See WIS. STAT. § 113.9 (1849) (penalizing individuals who assist in a suicide
despite not punishing the act of suicide).
34. See Act of Nov. 23, 1977, ch. 173, § 12, 1977 Wis. Sess. Laws 731 (codified as
amended at WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (2008)); see also WIS. STAT. § 939.50 (2008) (setting
forth the maximum penalties for felony convictions, which includes a $100,000 fine
and twenty-five years imprisonment for a Class D felony and a $10,000 fine and six
years imprisonment for a Class H felony).
35. See WIs. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (inferring that an individual is not guilty of
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suicide, Wisconsin seeks to preserve human life, prevent suicide, protect
vulnerable groups, such as the poor, elderly, and disabled, and avoid the
slippery slope towards euthanasia.3 6
C. Causation Under Wisconsin's Criminal Code
To prove causation in Wisconsin, the State must show that the
defendant's acts were a substantial factor in causing the crime.37 A
substantial factor is an act that is a significant cause of an unlawful death.3 8
The Wisconsin Supreme Court and Legislature have found that acts by an
accessory, co-conspirator, or accomplice in connection with an unlawful
killing are substantial factors.3 9 For example, in State v. Groth, the Court
held that knowingly handing a gun to the eventual shooter was a substantial
factor in the resulting murder.40 Wisconsin uses its accomplice liability
statute to prevent culpable individuals from circumventing punishment.4 1
The State courts and Legislature have also found that actions taken by an
individual during a felony are substantial factors in a resulting unlawful
killing, even if the defendant was not responsible for the final act that

assisted suicide if he was unaware that the decedent would use the assistance to commit
suicide); accord Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, 145 P.3d 76, 85 (N.M. Ct. App.
2006) (holding the defendant, a police officer, not guilty of assisted suicide for putting
his gun on an outdoor table while fixing a sprinkling system because he had no
knowledge that his stepdaughter was going to commit suicide).
36. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997) (upholding the
State of Washington's assisted suicide ban because it is rationally related to its interest
in preserving life); see also Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1187-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (affirming the trial court's decision to convict the defendant of euthanasia
rather than assisted suicide because he did not merely help his wife commit suicide but
directly caused the death by shooting her); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (8th ed.
2004) (defining euthanasia as the act of directly killing or bringing about the death of a
person who suffers from an incurable disease or condition for reasons of mercy).
37. See, e.g., State v. Block, 489 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that stabbing the decedent was a substantial factor in causing the decedent's death even
though the hospital's medical malpractice was the direct cause of death).
38. See State v. Toliver, 2001 WI App 254, 48, 248 Wis. 2d 527, 635 N.W.2d
905, at *12 (unpublished table decision) (holding that an instruction to kill was a
substantial cause of the murder); State v. McClose, 289 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980) (holding that car racing was a substantial cause of the resulting death).
39. See WIS. STAT. § 939.05 (2008) (stating that although an individual does not
directly commit a crime, he is a principal to that crime so long as he either (1)
intentionally aids or abets the commission of the crime or (2) directly or indirectly
participates in a conspiracy to commit the crime).
40. See State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299,
4-5, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d
163, 166-67, abrogatedon other grounds by State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, 291 Wis.
2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (applying the State's accomplice liability provision to find the
defendant guilty of first-degree intentional homicide).
41. See State v. Sharlow, 317 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), affd, 327
N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1983) (holding that as a party to the murder, the defendant's acts
were a substantial factor in the killing).
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directly caused the death.4 2 For example, in State v. Jackson, the State
convicted the defendant of felony murder when his accomplice shot and
killed the victim. 43 Wisconsin uses its felony murder provision to deter
violent crimes that have an improper disregard for human life. 4
D. In re Estate of Schunk
1. Facts

The decedent and testator, Edward A. Schunk, Jr., committed suicide in
In his will, which apportioned his estate, Mr. Schunk granted most
of his estate to his wife Linda and their daughter Megan, leaving next to
nothing for his six older children from previous relationships.4 6 In an
attempt to disqualify Linda and Megan from inheriting, the older children
filed a demand for formal proceedings to determine whether Linda and
Megan "unlawfully and intentionally killed" Mr. Schunk by assisting in his
suicide.4 7 The plaintiffs claimed that Linda and Megan assisted in Mr.
Schunk's suicide by taking him to an isolated location and knowingly
providing him with the means to commit suicide.4 8 In response, Linda and
Megan filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that even if they
assisted Mr. Schunk in committing suicide, the Wisconsin slayer statute
does not disqualify
anyone who commits assisted suicide because it is not a
' 9
"killing."
2006. 4

42. See Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (2008) (applying the State's felony murder provision
to felonies that make an ensuing death likely, such as burglary and robbery).
43. See 2009 WI App 27, 2, 763 N.W.2d 559, at *1 (unpublished table decision)
(describing how the defendant and his accomplice were robbing two drug dealers); see
also State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (holding the defendant
responsible for the death of his co-felon by applying the felony murder provision).
44. See State v. Noren, 371 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (contending
that felony murder should only attach to crimes inherently dangerous to life).
45. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 13, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760
N.W.2d 446 (mentioning that Mr. Schunk suffered from non-Hodgkin's lymphoma).
46. See id. (stating that Mr. Schunk lived with Linda and Megan); see also Ryan J.
Foley, Suicide Case Decided,- Court Says Family Can Inherit Estate Even if They
Assisted the Victim, WIs. STATE J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A6 (stating that Mr. Schunk's
estate was valued at $488,000 in 2006, and that it included eighty acres of land, a
$100,000 life insurance policy, equipment from his logging company, and other
money).
47. See Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 3, 760 N.W.2d at 447; see also David Ziemer,
Wisconsin Court of Appeals Rules Relatives Who Assist Suicide Can Inherit, WIs. L.J.,
Oct. 6, 2008 (stating that the Wisconsin Attorney General did not bring criminal
charges alleging that Linda and Megan committed assisted suicide).
48. See Schunk, 2008 WI App 157,
5, 760 N.W.2d at 447 (noting that Mr.
Schunk's cause of death stemmed from a single gunshot wound to the chest).
49. See id. 4, 760 N.W.2d at 447 (arguing that assisted suicide is not a "killing"
because a person who assists another in committing suicide is not depriving the other
of his desire to live).
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2. Opinion
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment-Mr. Schunk's other children-the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed that Linda and Megan had assisted in
Mr. Schunk's suicide.5 ° The court then proceeded to interpret the slayer
and
statute to determine whether assisted suicide was an "intentional
51
unlawful killing" within the meaning of the State's slayer statute.
Claiming that the definition of "to kill" is "to deprive of life," the court
found that a person who assisted another in voluntarily taking his own life
was not depriving him of life because he no longer had a desire to live.52
Because Mr. Schunk's final act of pulling the trigger was the act that
directly deprived him of life, the court held that Linda and Megan did not
"kill" Mr. Schunk when they provided him the shotgun he used to commit
53
suicide.
III. ANALYSIS
A. In Wisconsin, When an Individual Commits Assisted Suicide, He
"Kills"
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals misapplied the statutory principle that a
court must interpret words and phrases according to their common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning.54 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
applied a plain, ordinary meaning to the word "to kill" without determining
whether the word had a specific legal definition. Failing to recognize the
statutory principle that courts are to give legal words their specific
and
definitions as they exist in the law, the court consulted a dictionary
56
found that the ordinary definition of"to kill" was "to deprive of life.",
50. See id 5, 760 N.W.2d at 447 (recognizing that it was disputed whether Linda
and Megan had knowledge of Mr. Schunk's suicide plans).
51. See id.
10-13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (discussing that when a word has an
ordinary meaning, the court must use that meaning).
52. See id. 13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (finding that Mr. Schunk deprived himself
of life by shooting himself with the shotgun).
53. See id. 7 13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (maintaining that one who provides the
means to a suicide is not commonly labeled a killer). But see People ex rel. Oakland
County Prosecuting Att'y v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(describing how Dr. Kevorkian illegally furnished the means to a suicide).
54. Cf WIS. STAT. § 990.01 (2008) (requiring that all words and phrases be
construed according to common and approved usage except when they have a specific
meaning in the law).
55. See State v. Block, 489 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (reaffirming
that the prosecution needs to prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that a defendant's
conduct was a substantial factor in the unlawful death of another in order to convict
him for a "killing" under Wisconsin law).
56. See Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (describing how
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After having defined "to kill," the court examined whether a person who
assisted a decedent in voluntarily taking his own life deprived the decedent
of life.5 7 In the court's opinion, an individual does not "kill" unless his act
is the direct cause of death.58 The court deemed the word "deprive" as the
operative word in its analysis to find that Mr. Schunk deprived himself of
life when he voluntarily decided to shoot himself with the shotgun.5
Therefore, the court ruled that suicide assistance, such as providing the
means to commit suicide, can never be the direct cause of death because it
never deprives an individual of life.6 °
Although the court's analysis appears to be reasonable, it notably failed
to recognize a key principle of statutory interpretation: when words or
phrases have technical or specific meanings in the law, the court must
apply those definitions rather than their ordinary meanings. 61 Under
Wisconsin law, an individual "kills" if his act is a substantial factor in the
death of another individual.62 Thus, the State's basic legal principles of
causation do not exclude an individual's conduct from causing a "killing"
simply because it is not the direct cause of death.63 The proper legal
definition of "to kill" is much broader: to do an act that is a substantial
factor in causing the death of another individual.64
If the definition of the phrase "to kill" was as narrow as the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals interpreted it to be, the unlawful conduct necessary to
trigger the slayer rule would be substantially narrower than its common law
the court's definition of "to kill" was ironically from the dictionary referred to by the
plaintiffs, who argued that assisted suicide is a "killing").
57. See id
5, 760 N.W.2d at 447 (assuming Linda and Megan provided Mr.
Schunk with the loaded shotgun).
58. See id. 14, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (arguing that assisting in a suicide is not the
same as depriving the decedent of his life).
59. See id. 13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (defining "to kill" as "to deprive of life" as
referred to by the plaintiffs in their motion in objection to summary judgment).
60. See id. 13-14, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49. But see State v. Willie, 2007 WI App
27,
27, 299 Wis. 2d 531, 728 N.W.2d 343, 354 (upholding the defendant's felony
conviction because his acts, such as the purchase of alcohol for minors, were
substantial factors in the victim's death).
61. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 990.01 (2008) (providing that the specific meaning of
"acquire" includes an acquisition by purchase, grant, gift, bequest, or through an
exercise of condemnation power).
62. See, e.g., State v. Block, 489 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (finding
that despite the hospital's negligence, the act of stabbing the decedent was a substantial
factor in the death because without that act, the decedent would not have been at the
hospital requesting medical care to keep himself alive).
63. See Willie, 2007 WI App 27, 26, 728 N.W.2d at 353-54 (equating an act that
is a substantial factor with an act that is likely to cause death as a natural and probable
result).
64. See, e.g., Block, 489 N.W.2d at 718 (analyzing how medical negligence that
directly causes death cannot break the causal chain when it occurs as a result of a lifethreatening situation that the defendant created).
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predecessor and would allow accomplices, accessories, and individuals
involved in a felony murder to avoid the slayer rule. Such a narrow
interpretation is contrary to the intent of the Legislature. 65 Therefore, when
the court gave the phrase "to kill" a plain, ordinary meaning rather than its
specific meaning in the law, the court failed to correctly apply the rules of
statutory interpretation to effect the intent of the Legislature.66
B. Culpability in Wisconsin Is Not Limited to Acts that Are the Direct
Cause of Death
In Wisconsin, the law only requires that a defendant's acts be a
substantial factor in causing death for him to be culpable of "killing." The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals therefore erred by narrowly defining "to kill"
as to "deprive of life," and in so doing, thwarted the intent of the
Legislature.67 Whereas a common, collegiate dictionary definition of the
phrase "to kill" may indeed be to deprive of life, the accurate legal
definition of "to kill" is "to cause death., 68 To establish that an act
"caused" a death in Wisconsin, the State must prove that the act was a
substantial factor in bringing about the death. 69 Because the defendant's
acts only need to be a substantial factor in bringing about the death of
another individual, the appropriate definition of the phrase "to kill"
includes acts that are not the direct cause of death.7 °
Wisconsin law penalizes acts as substantial factors in the death of an
individual when death is a reasonably foreseeable result of such acts.71 In
65. See Wis. STAT. § 939.05 (2008) (criminalizing the acts of accomplices,
accessories, and co-conspirators even if they did not directly commit the crime); Wis.
STAT. § 940.03 (2008) (penalizing an individual for felony murder even if he does not
directly cause the death of the victim).
66. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14 (2008) (excluding inheritance to any killer who
"unlawfully and intentionally kills" another) (emphasis added).
67. See Block, 489 N.W.2d at 718 (observing that there can be multiple substantial
factors causing a death).
68. See, e.g., State v. Toliver, 2001 WI App 254, 15, 248 Wis. 2d 527, 635
N.W.2d 905, at *4 (unpublished table decision) (upholding the defendant's conviction
for first-degree intentional homicide because his actions, telling his brother to tie up
and then shoot the individual who stole money from them, were substantial factors in
causing the death of the victim).
69. See, e.g., State v. McClose, 289 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that when car racing on a public road leads to a fatal accident, each actor is
responsible for the death regardless of which automobile directly causes it); see also
Walter Dickey et al., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin

Revision, Wis. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (1989) (describing how the "substantial factor" test
applies to every homicide in Wisconsin's penal code).
70. See, e.g., Block, 489 N.W.2d at 718 (holding that the hospital's medical
malpractice was not an intervening cause of death because the defendant's action put
the decedent in a position to require medical attention to remain alive).
71. See, e.g., McClose, 289 N.W.2d at 342 (finding that the death of a motorist or
pedestrian is a reasonably foreseeable result of car races on public roads).
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particular, Wisconsin treats two specific types of actors as "killers" when
death is a natural and probable result of their conduct: (1) an accessory,
accomplice, or co-conspirator, and (2) a felony murderer. 72 Individuals
who assist in a suicide are similar to these actors in various ways.73
1. Like Wisconsin's Accomplice Liability Provision,Its Ban on Assisted
Suicide Punishes Conduct that Is a SubstantialFactorin a "Killing"

Wisconsin's accomplice liability provision holds a felon accountable for
having "killed" regardless of whether the death was directly attributable to
his acts.74 Therefore, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals hindered the purpose
of the slayer statute when it failed to recognize that the State's criminal
prohibition of assisted suicide similarly holds a defendant accountable for
having "killed" regardless of whether the death was directly attributable to
his acts. 75 The court failed to notice the logical connection between an

accomplice, accessory, or co-conspirator and someone who commits
assisted suicide: none of them can be said to have directly "killed" the
deceased.

Wisconsin law regards an accessory, accomplice, or co-conspirator to a
homicide as a "killer" even when he is not responsible for the final act that

directly causes a death.76 For example, in State v. Groth, the defendant was
an accomplice who faced charges of second-degree reckless homicide for
providing the murder weapon to his partner.77 The court found that the
he provided
defendant intentionally aided and abetted in the killing because
78
kill.
to
it
use
would
he
knowing
partner
his
to
a loaded gun
Similar to the accomplice in Groth, a person who assists in a suicide

72. See, e.g., State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (ruling that the
defendant, an accomplice in an attempted robbery, caused the death of his co-felon,
even though the store clerk shot the co-felon, because the defendant's decision to rob
the store was a substantial factor).
73. See WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (requiring a defendant who commits assisted
suicide to be charged with a Class H felony).
74. See Wis. STAT. § 939.05 (2008) (using the substantial factor, as opposed to a
direct cause, doctrine to criminalize the acts of accomplices, accessories, and coconspirators that lead to homicides).
75. See § 940.12 (requiring that a defendant's assistance be a substantial factor in a
suicide).
76. See § 939.05 (punishing an accomplice, accessory, or co-conspirator as a
principal in the first-degree).
77. See 2002 WI App 299, 4, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d 163, 166-67
(discussing how the defendant was the only one carrying a loaded weapon and how the
defendant and his friends got into a scuffle the previous weekend at the same tavern
with the same group of men).
4-5, 655 N.W.2d at 166-68 (explaining that to intentionally aid and
78. See id.
abet a codefendant in first-degree intentional homicide, a defendant must have known
that the codefendant intended to kill the victim and had the purpose to assist the
codefendant in committing the crime).
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must have knowledge that the recipient of the assistance intends to use it in
a "killing., 79 Therefore, like the accomplice in Groth, a person
intentionally aids and abets in a suicide when he hands a loaded weapon to
an individual who intends to kill himself because he knows that death will
be a substantially likely result of his assistance.
As illustrated in Groth and the State's prohibition of assisted suicide,
Wisconsin's courts and Legislature have determined that a "killer" need not
be the principal in the first degree to be responsible for the "unlawful and
intentional killing" of another individual. 81 A principal in the second
degree, such as an accomplice, co-conspirator, or accessory, shares equal
responsibility with a principal in the first degree for an "unlawful and
intentional killing. 8 2 The law extends equal responsibility to these
individuals because they engage in conduct that is inconsistent with a
proper regard for human life.83 Without equal punishments, individuals
could reduce exposure to criminal and civil sanctions by simply hiring or
procuring someone else to directly cause a death. 84 As a result, Wisconsin
courts disqualify accessories, accomplices, and co-conspirators under the
State's slayer statute. 5 Because an individual who commits assisted
79. See WIs. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (requiring the actor to not only assist in a
suicide, but also requiring him to know or intend that his acts will naturally result in
suicide). Compare Groth, 2002 WI App 299, 3, 655 N.W.2d at 166 (finding that the
defendant knew his friend was intending to get revenge for a bar scuffle that injured the
friend the previous weekend), with In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 2, 314
Wis. 2d 483, 760 N.W.2d 446, 446-47 (assuming that, for purposes of the motion for
summary judgment, the defendants knew Mr. Schunk intended to commit suicide).
80. Compare Groth, 2002 WI App 299, 5, 655 N.W.2d at 167-68 (providing a
friend a loaded weapon knowing he was going to use it to kill), with Schunk, 2008 WI
App 157, 5, 760 N.W.2d at 447 (providing a loved one a loaded weapon knowing he
was going to use it to kill himself).
81. See, e.g., Groth, 2002 WI App 299, 5, 655 N.W.2d at 167-68 (holding an
individual guilty of first-degree murder, an "unlawful and intentional killing," when he
provided a loaded gun to a friend who he knew intended to use it to kill); see also Wis.
STAT. § 940.12 (making it a Class H felony for an individual to assist in a suicide with
the intent that death will result).
82. See WIS. STAT. § 939.05 (2008) (treating accomplices, accessories, and coconspirators as principals in the first degree); see also, Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy
Killing and the Right to Inherit,61 U. CrN. L. REv. 803, 849 n.214 (1993) (stating that

some states have expressly barred accomplices, accessories, or co-conspirators from
inheriting under their slayer rules).
83. See, e.g., State v. Bobby P., 539 N.W.2d 338, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (upholding charges against an accomplice as a principal in
the first-degree because his participation in a premeditated attempt to kill one person
and his reckless endangerment of others showed an utter disregard for life).
84. See, e.g., State v. Sharlow, 317 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd,
327 N.W.2d 692 (Wis. 1983) (rejecting the defendant's argument that he should not be
convicted of first-degree murder because his actions exhibited his desire to participate
in the murder).
85. See, e.g., § 939.05(i)(c) (charging a person who hires or procures an individual
to perform a murder with first-degree intentional homicide-an "unlawful and
intentional killing"); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
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suicide intentionally and knowingly aids and abets in the "killing" of
another individual, Wisconsin courts should also disqualify these
individuals under the State's slayer statute. 86
2. Like Wisconsin's Felony Murder Provision,Its Ban on Assisted Suicide
Punishes Conduct thatIs a SubstantialFactorin a "Killing"
Wisconsin's felony murder provision holds a felon accountable for
having "killed" an individual in the course of a violent crime regardless of
whether the death was directly attributable to his acts.87 The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals failed to notice the logical connection between someone
who commits felony murder and someone who commits assisted suicide:
neither individual can be said to have directly "killed" the deceased. 88
Wisconsin law regards an individual who causes the death of another
individual while committing or attempting to commit a felony as a "killer"
even if he is not responsible for the final act that directly causes the death.89
For example, in State v. Jackson, the State convicted the defendant of
felony murder when his accomplice killed one of the victims during the
course of a burglary and robbery. 90 The State's felony murder provision
applied to the defendant because the felonies of burglary and robbery are
crimes that have an improper disregard for the value of human life. 91
Felony murder and assisted suicide have three specific similarities that
exhibit why Wisconsin has an interest in disqualifying individuals who
commit assisted suicide from the decedent's inheritance.9 2
First,
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. g (2003) (describing how slayer statutes disqualify an
accomplice, accessory, or co-conspirator to an "unlawful and intentional killing").
86. See, e.g., Robert Garrison, Eagle Teen Accused of Assisting in Roommate's
Suicide, KJCTNEws8.coM, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.kjct8.com/global/story.asp?
s=9026486 (reporting that after the victim told the arrestee he wanted to commit
suicide, the arrestee retrieved a loaded shotgun and handed it to him).
87. See, e.g., State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (finding the
defendant guilty of felony murder even though the direct cause of his accomplice's
death was the store clerk's decision to fire his gun in self-defense).
88. See Wis. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (stating that a defendant's actions do not need
to directly cause a suicide for the State's criminal prohibition of assisted suicide to
apply).
89. See Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (2008) (penalizing a felony murderer for not more than
fifteen years in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment for the felony that led to
the killing).
90. See 2009 WI App 27, 4, 763 N.W.2d 559, at * 1 (unpublished table decision)
(describing how the defendant knew that weapons were involved because he hit a
victim over the head with his gun and because he asked the victims where their guns
were).
91. See § 940.03 (applying felony murder to battery, sexual assault, false
imprisonment, kidnapping, arson, burglary, operating a vehicle without an owner's
consent, and robbery).
92. See Foley, supra note 46, at A6 (quoting Barbara Lyons, Executive Director of
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Wisconsin, like other states, uses a felony murder provision to deter violent
crimes such as robbery and burglary because these crimes often result in
unlawful deaths.93 Similarly, Wisconsin outlaws assisted suicide to deter
conduct that the State also feels is inconsistent with a proper regard for
Second, whereas crimes deterred by felony murder
human life. 94
provisions are likely to result in an ensuing death, when someone
knowingly offers assistance to help one commit suicide, an ensuing death is
substantially likely to occur. 95 Finally, and most significantly, to assign
culpability for assisted suicide or felony murder, the State only needs to
prove that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
death.96 Therefore, in the crimes' respective contexts, the State may
convict a defendant of assisted suicide or felony murder even though
another person fires the fatal shot, and hence, Wisconsin regards both
actors as "killers. 97
3. Wisconsin's Slayer Statute Should Punish Assisted Suicide as It Does
Accomplice Liability and Felony Murder
Wisconsin's felony murder, accomplice liability, and assisted suicide
provisions exhibit that the State's proper legal definition of "to kill" does
not require the unlawful act to be the last, direct act in the causal chain.98
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals failed to carry out the legislative intent of
the slayer statute when the court applied the plain meaning of the phrase

the Wisconsin Right to Life) ("It's a horrendous decision .... It certainly gives

impetus to any one who wants more money to assist their loved one who has money
with their suicide.").
93. See State v. Noren, 371 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (arguing that
felonies causing death must be inherently dangerous to life for felony murder to apply).
94. See Wis. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (continuing the State's prohibition against
assisted suicide, which started in 1859); see also Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S.
702, 728, 733 (1997) (noting that states have a vested interest in preserving human
life).
95. Compare State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299, 4, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 655 N.W.2d
163, 166-67 (finding that when the defendant furnished a loaded gun to his friend, he
knew it was highly likely that the friend was going to use it to kill in an act of
vengeance), with People ex rel. Oakland County Prosecuting Att'y v. Kevorkian, 534
N.W.2d 172, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that when Dr. Kevorkian furnished
the suicide device to the decedent, he knew she was going to use it to kill herself).
96. See, e.g., State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (holding that
the defendant's acts were substantial factors in causing his accomplice's death because
the robbery attempt would not have taken place without the acts, and because the death
was a reasonably foreseeable result of the robbery).
97. See, e.g., id. at 404 (holding that the defendant caused the death of his co-felon
even though the direct cause of death was from the gun of the intended victim because
the defendant planned and set the robbery in motion).
98. See State v. Block, 489 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an
individual "kills" whenever his conduct is a substantial factor in the unlawful death of
another).
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"to kill" rather than its specific legal definition. 99 Although the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals may be correct in stating that an individual who assists in
a suicide is not directly depriving another person of life, Wisconsin law still
considers and treats him as a "killer."' 10 0
To be guilty of assisted suicide under Wisconsin law, an individual must
intend for the decedent to take his own life and the individual's actions
must be a substantial factor in either the decedent's decision to, or ability
to, commit his suicide. 01' Therefore, anyone who is found guilty of
assisted suicide has caused a death and is appropriately regarded as a
"killer." 10 2 Such a result is practical because it prevents an individual from
circumventing both criminal sanctions and civil penalties.,0 3 As exhibited
in Schunk, Linda and Megan circumvented civil penalties by arguing that
because none of their acts were a direct cause of death, the slayer statute
04
should not apply. 1
In addition, the slayer statute should apply to assisted suicide because,
like felony murder and accomplice liability provisions, the disqualification
of individuals who commit assisted suicide furthers Wisconsin's interest in
preserving life.' 0 5 Like an accomplice to a killing or a party to a felony
murder, one who commits assisted suicide should be barred from inheriting
under the slayer statute because his assistance was a substantial factor in
06
causing the decedent's death.1
99. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 13, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760
N.W.2d 446, 448-49 (arguing that to cause a "killing," an act must directly deprive
another of life).
100. See WIs. STAT. § 940.12 (2008) (penalizing assisted suicide as a felony because
it is a crime against life).
101. See id.; see also State v. Webster, 538 N.W.2d 810, 815-16 (Wis. Ct. App.
1995) (noting that intent also can be established by showing that the actor knew death
would be a natural and probable result of his acts).
102. Compare State v. Groth, 2002 WI App 299,
4, 39, 258 Wis. 2d 889, 655
N.W.2d 163, 166-67, 174-75 (affirming the defendant's conviction of second-degree
reckless homicide when he furnished a loaded gun to his friend who he knew was
intending to kill someone), with In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 636 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (finding that an individual is penalized under the criminal code when he
furnishes the means of a resulting suicide).
103. See Wis. STAT. § 939.30 (2008) (setting forth penalties for defendants who
attempt to avoid criminal liability by soliciting others to commit them, such as a Class
F felony for one who solicits another for murder).
104. See Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 13, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (suggesting that
furnishing the means of death should not render an individual guilty of having "killed"
because the subsequent acts are intervening causes). But see People ex rel. Oakland
County Prosecuting Att'y v. Kevorkian, 534 N.W.2d 172, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)
(describing how Dr. Kevorkian helped kill the decedent by furnishing a suicide device
that merely required the decedent to press a button to inject herself with deadly
chemicals).
105. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 733 (1997) (analyzing how
statutes that bar assisted suicide make suicide and euthanasia less likely).
106. Compare Wis. STAT. § 939.05 (2008) (punishing an accomplice, accessory or
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C. When Wisconsin's Slayer Statute Is Silent, the Courts Must Apply the
Common Law Principle that No Killer Should Benefit from His Own
Wrongdoing
Wisconsin's slayer statute mandates that the courts apply the common
law principle when faced with wrongful acquisitions not covered by the
statute. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals failed to identify the intent of the
Legislature, and thus, the court erred by not applying the common
law
10 7
slayer rule to disqualify individuals who commit assisted suicide.
When state legislatures codified their respective slayer rules, they often
left general discretion to the courts to interpret language that included
undefined or broad legal terms, such as "intent," "unlawful," and
"killing."' 1 8 Moreover, these legislatures understood that state courts
would eventually be presented with disputes not previously foreseen by the
drafters, and thus expressly gave broad discretion to the state courts to
adjudicate these issues according to the common law principle.' 0 9 In
Schunk, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals failed to properly utilize such
discretion when determining whether the slayer
statute should disqualify an
0
individual who commits assisted suicide."
Judicial review under slayer statutes is also a practical device that state
legislatures envisioned. 1 To preclude the courts from hearing issues that
the legislature had not previously considered would moot the claims of
legitimate plaintiffs while placing an inordinate burden on the legislative
process to resolve uncertainties in the law." 2 Moreover, the right to
co-conspirator to a homicide as a principal in the first-degree even if he did not directly
cause the death), and Wis. STAT. § 940.03 (2008) (punishing a felon for a homicide
even if he did not directly cause the death), with WIS. STAT. § 940.12 (punishing one
who assists in a suicide even if he did not directly cause the death).
107. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14(4) (2008) (preventing "killers" from benefiting from
their crimes when the slayer statute is silent or ambiguous on the type of benefit at
issue or how it was acquired).
108. See, e.g., In re Estate of Turner, 454 N.E.2d 1247, 1250-52 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) (interpreting whether in order for a "killing" to be "intentional," a "killer" needs
to have either (a) merely intended his conduct or (b) had the necessary criminal intent
when committing the crime).
109. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hackl, 604 N.W.2d 579, 583-84 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(using the general discretion the Legislature had given to it, the court applied the
common law principle to disqualify a killer from receiving his wife's marital interest in
his pension); see also § 854.14(4) (mandating that the courts treat a wrongful
acquisition of property not covered by the statute in accordance with the common law
principle).
110. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157,
7-18, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760
N.W.2d 446, 447-50 (limiting analysis to the question of whether one who commits
assisted suicide deprives another of life).
111. See Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71
IOWA L. REv. 489, 547 (1986) (arguing that the inevitable ambiguity of statutory
language requires toleration of some statutory interpretation by the courts).
112. See State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. for La Crosse County, 340
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resolve property disputes arising from wills and
intestate succession is a
113
power that legislatures reserved to state courts.
In Wisconsin, the Legislature has not only given broad discretion to the
courts, but the courts have recognized and frequently referred to this
discretion in their decisions. 114 After the Wisconsin Legislature codified
the slayer rule in 1981, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not hesitate,
when the statute was silent on the issue of wrongful accquisitions, to base
its decision on the common law principle rather than consulting extrinsic
sources to ascertain what the Legislature might have intended in a
particular circumstance.'1 15
In Hackl, the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the common law slayer
principle to bar a murderer from receiving his wife's marital interest in his
pension even though the 1981 slayer provisions were silent on whether an
"unlawful and intentional killing" prevents the terminable interest rule from
canceling his wife's interest.1 16 In its reasoning, the court found that the
Legislature intended for the courts to rely on the common law principle
when the statute was ambiguous on an issue.1 17 Like the court in Hackl, the
court in Schunk should have consulted the common law principle because
the slayer statute was ambiguous' 18 on whether assisted suicide was an
"unlawful and intentional killing."
The Wisconsin Legislature explicitly authorized the result in cases such
as Hackl and authorized the continued use of the common law principle in
its 1997 amendments to the slayer provisions. 1 9 Wisconsin's slayer statute
N.W.2d 460, 464 (Wis. 1983) (claiming that when an issue is likely to arise again, the
court should consider it to resolve the uncertainty in the law).
113. See In re Wilkins' Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 655 (Wis. 1927), overruled inpart by
In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958) (stating that all doctrines and maxims
of equity that are applicable to courts of equity generally are likewise applicable to
county courts when they decide probate matters).
114. See, e.g., Hackl, 604 N.W.2d at 582-84 (basing its decision on the common law
principle that no killer should profit from his wrongdoing rather than consulting
extrinsic sources to determine the intent of the slayer statute).
115. See, e.g., id.(applying the common law principle to prevent a murderer from
wrongfully acquiring a marital interest of his wife's, which the State's terminable
interest statute had terminated at her death).
116. See id.at 583 nn.4-5 (noting that the murder occurred before the Legislature
consolidated all the various slayer provisions into the slayer statute in 1997); see also
WIS. STAT. § 766.31(3)(a) (2008) ("terminable interest rule") (terminating the marital
property interest of a nonemployee spouse in a deferred employment plan when she or
he predeceases the employee spouse).
117. See Hackl, 604 N.W.2d at 584 (finding that the uncertainty in the law was a
result of the Legislature's failure to contemplate the case's circumstances when it
enacted the terminable interest rule).
118. See id.(recognizing that if the common law principle had not been applied, the
wife's death would have terminated her marital interest in her husband's pension
benefits).
119. See WIS. STAT. § 854.14(4) (2008) (mandating that the courts treat a wrongful
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now mandates that the courts treat a wrongful acquisition of property not
covered by the slayer statute in accordance with the common law
principle. 120 Therefore, when the Wisconsin Court of Appeals neglected to
apply the common law principle after doing a textual interpretation of the
slayer statute in Schunk,
it failed to use the broad discretion the Legislature
12
reserved to the courts.

1

The Wisconsin Legislature not only expressly authorized the courts to
use the common law principle when needed, but it expanded and broadened
the scope of the slayer statute when the drafters made several key
amendments.122 First, the drafters amended the type of "killing" from
"felonious" to "unlawful," thereby extending the statute to non-felonious
killings. 123 Second, the drafters lessened the burden of proof of the party
opposing acquisition by the killer from clear and convincing evidence to a
preponderance of the evidence, thereby extending the statute's reach to
cases with less evidentiary proof. 24 Because the amendments result in the
inclusion of a greater number of killings, the drafters did not intend for the
Wisconsin Court
of Appeals to apply the slayer statue as narrowly as it did
25
in Schunk.1
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals's decision in Schunk creates three
unintended and onerous consequences by allowing
individuals who commit
26
assisted suicide to benefit from a wrongdoing.
acquisition of property not covered by the slayer statute in accordance with the
principle that a killer cannot profit from his wrongdoing).
120. See § 854.14(4), (6) (exempting a beneficiary from the common law principle

only if the decedent's wishes would be best carried out by allowing him to inherit or if
the decedent expressly exempts the beneficiary from the application of the slayer
statute in his will).
121. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157,
7-18, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760
N.W.2d 446, 447-50 (limiting analysis to the question of whether one who commits
assisted suicide deprives another of life).
122. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 cmt. (Supp. 2009) (claiming that the
principle that a wrongdoer may not profit from his own wrongdoing is a civil concept,
and that the probate court is the proper forum to determine the effect of various killings
on succession to the decedent's property).
123. See § 854.14(2) (opening the door to the application of the slayer statute to
misdemeanors).
124. See § 854.14(5)(c) (noting that a court does not need to decide whether there
was an "unlawful and intentional killing" when there is a final criminal judgment or
adjudication of delinquency establishing an "unlawful and intentional killing").
125. Cf In re Estate of Hackl, 604 N.W.2d 579, 584-86 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(extending the scope of the slayer statute broadly to include the wrongful acquisition of
marital benefits).
126. See Schunk, 2008 WI App 157,
13, 15, 760 N.W.2d at 448-49 (holding that
although assisted suicide may be "intentional" and "unlawful," it is outside the scope of
the slayer statute because it is not a "killing").
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First, the Schunk decision increases the likelihood that suicide will be
pursued and achieved because individuals will be more likely to offer
assistance - a result inconsistent with Wisconsin's criminal prohibition of
assisted suicide.127 The lack of a ban on inheritance may financially
motivate individuals to try to hasten or increase their inheritance by either
accepting a request to assist in a suicide or inducing one to commit
suicide. 128 For example, without the risk of inheritance disqualification,
potential beneficiaries who are paying high medical bills or sacrificing a
large amount of time and care are likely to have an expanded
role in
129
encouraging individuals who are terminally ill to commit suicide.
Second, the Schunk decision attaches a possible inheritance penalty to
individuals who refrain from offering assistance, and thus makes assistance
more likely. 13 By not complying with a loved one's request to assist in his
suicide, a testator might reduce the inheritance of that beneficiary while
increasing the inheritance of the beneficiary that ultimately assists in the
suicide. 131
Third, the Schunk decision creates a presumption against life for
terminally ill individuals like Mr. Schunk, a presumption that is at odds
with the State's interest in preserving life. 132 A lack of an inheritance bar
creates a loophole for potential beneficiaries who no longer wish to spend
the time or money necessary to keep terminally ill individuals alive for as
long as they might wish.' 3 3
Despite these policy arguments, the final section of Wisconsin's slayer
statute allows a testator to nullify the statute to allow a beneficiary who

127. WIs. STAT. § 940.12 (2008).
128. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 729 (1997) (noting that despite
the lack of bans on suicide, bans on assisted suicide continue because they reflect the
gravity with which society views the decision to take one's own life and its reluctance
to encourage or promote these decisions).
129. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 487 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that the mercy killer's motives may have included a desire to no longer care
for the victim who had osteoporosis and Alzheimer's Disease).
130. See Rohde, supra note 17, at B1 (inferring that Linda and Megan might have
received a larger portion of the estate because they agreed to assist in Mr. Schunk's
suicide).
131. See Wis. STAT. § 854.14(6) (2008) (omitting language that would prevent
testators from adjusting beneficiaries' inheritance interests, but making two exceptions
to the application of the slayer rule: (1) when the testator exempts an individual from
the statute's application in his will or (2) when the "factual circumstances" of the
killing show that the testator's will would best be carried out by alternate disposition).
132. See Glucksburg, 521 U.S. at 732 (finding that assisted suicide bans protect the
poor, elderly, and terminally ill from public presumptions that these groups have a
lower desire to live and from taxpayers' and family members' potential desire to avoid
financing their end-of-life health-care costs).
133. See Gilbert, 487 So. 2d at 1187 (upholding the murder conviction of a mercy
killer, noting that his motives likely included a desire to no longer care for the victim).
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assists in his suicide to inherit. 134 Nonetheless, requiring a testator to
exempt an individual from the slayer statute has better policy implications
than the decision in Schunk because, by manifesting an intent to die in a
notarized will, the presumption that a terminally ill individual wishes to
continue living will be negated while the likelihood that beneficiaries can
induce loved ones into committing suicide in the spur-of-the moment will
be reduced.' 35
In light of these detrimental policy implications, the Legislature should
nullify the Schunk decision and amend the slayer statute to prevent testators
from rewarding exempted individuals who assist in a suicide and from
penalizing individuals who refuse. 136 The Legislature should require a
testator who (a) exempts an individual from the slayer statute in his will,
and (b) in the ten years before or after the exemption increases the
individual's interest, to document reasons other than agreeing to assist in
his suicide to validate the beneficiary's increased allotment. 37 By so
doing, a court can later determine whether the primary purpose of the
increased allotment was for the beneficiary's assistance 138in the suicide
rather than for the documented reasons provided in the will.
V. CONCLUSION

By choosing not to review the Wisconsin Court of Appeals's decision in
Schunk, the Wisconsin Supreme Court missed an opportunity to harmonize
39
the State's slayer statute with its prohibition against assisted suicide.'
Without a review, the Wisconsin court system has effectively failed to
134. See § 854.14(6)(b) (nullifying the slayer statute in limited circumstances when
the State places a greater emphasis on the express wishes of the testator than on its
interest in not rewarding wrongdoers).
135. See id. (limiting exemptions to individuals who testators expressly exempt in
their will); see also Erlanger, supra note 21, app. C at 33 n.25 (stating that the drafting
committee believes that the attestation requirement for wills helps ensure that the
waiver is intentional and genuine).
136. With the Schunk decision nullified and in order to effect the purpose of section
854.14(6)(b) of the Wisconsin Probate Code, the Legislature should prevent state
prosecutors from using wills as prima facie evidence to convict individuals for assisted
suicide.
137. Cf 26 U.S.C. § 302(c)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring that a shareholder must neither
have received the redeemed stock from a family member ten years before, nor have
received other stock from the redeeming corporation ten years after the redemption in
order for the family attribution tax rules not to apply).
138. See In re Wilkins' Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 655 (Wis. 1927), overruled in part by
In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958) (noting that courts can apply equity
doctrines to decide probate matters, especially pertaining to wills).
139. See In re Estate of Schunk, 2008 WI App 157, 13, 314 Wis. 2d 483, 760
N.W.2d 446, 448-49, cert. denied sub nom. Lemmer v. Schunk, 2009 WI 23, 764
N.W.2d 532 (implying that Linda and Megan may have prevailed even if the case
survived summary judgment since there was not strong evidentiary proof that they had
committed assisted suicide).
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address that, like a felony murderer, an accomplice, a co-conspirator, and
an accessory, an individual who commits assisted suicide "kills" because
4
his assistance is a substantial factor in the resulting death. 1
As a result, the Wisconsin court system has opened the door to several
onerous consequences - chief among them the potential to benefit from a
felony at the detriment of other beneficiaries. 141 The Wisconsin Legislature
should not only act to expressly reject the decision in Schunk, but should
also work to prevent benefactors from increasing a beneficiary's
inheritance in exchange for suicide assistance when they utilize section
142
854.14(6)(b) to nullify the slayer statute.
The consequences that now may impact Wisconsin without legislative
action may also soon extend far beyond the State's borders. As other states
have yet to determine whether their respective slayer statutes disqualify
individuals who commit assisted suicide, the reasoning of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals may become a persuasive basis for other state courts or
143
legislatures to exempt assisted suicide from the slayer rule.

140. Compare Wis.

STAT.

STAT. § 940.03 (2008).

§ 940.12, with Wis.

STAT.

§ 939.05 (2008), and Wis.

141. See WIs. STAT. § 854.14(6)(b) (2008) (allowing testators to exempt individuals
from the slayer statute in their wills so the individuals may inherit despite committing
assisted suicide, while not prohibiting testators from decreasing the interests of
beneficiaries who are not involved in the assisted suicide).
142. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (2008) (eliminating any vagueness in
Delaware's slayer statute by defining "slayer" to describe only persons guilty of
committing manslaughter and first and second-degree murder).
143. See Foley, supra note 46, at A6 (quoting Boston College Law Professor Ray

Madoff) ("I think this is a significant ruling .... This is something that people have

been curious about where the law would draw the line and it's interesting to actually

have a case addressing it.").

